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Abstract 
European Union has been exposed to major changes on global natural gas markets 
since beginning of 21.century. Shale gas, development, liberalization on Russian market 
accompanied by lower consumption due to economic crises and interconnecting of natural 
gas network created a matrix of interacting elements which can clearly influence energy 
security of EU. The aim of this article was to analyze how the global trends on natural gas 
market from recent years so far affected the EU natural gas market in terms of diversification 
with special focus being dedicated to Slovakia. We came to conclusion that shale gas has so 
far only indirect implications, LNG impact is limited and EU will be in the closest future 
affected mainly by Russian natural gas export politics. As case of Slovakia documents EU 
diversification efforts have not been successful so far and EU internal energy market suffers 
from policies distorting market environment. 
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Introduction 
During last years the natural gas market has gone through significant changes. It has 
now been more than 12 years since U.S. started large scale extraction of shale gas, reverted 
up the state of what seemed to be inevitable decline of domestic production and Golden age 
of gas was announced (IEA, 2011). New LNG supplies that came on stream at the same time 
as new endogenous sources of U.S. natural gas were made available led to gas glut situation 
and global LNG trade that was pushed by economical and physical availability of new 
sources has risen by 129 % during that time. These changes on supply side have clearly 
consequences to demand side. EU efforts for reaching gas supply security now looks 
realistically more achievable and despite some hurdles, better conditions for gas consumers 
might be reachable in not so distant future as a result of not only LNG going global but also 
EU infrastructure integration initiatives and development on Russian natural gas market.  
The aim of this article is to analyze how the global trends on natural gas market from 
recent years so far affected the EU natural gas market in terms of diversification with special 
focus being dedicated to Slovakia. The article continues with characterizing the development 
on global gas market, especially changes concerning shale gas (r)evolution and Russian gas 
market. In second part of our article we focus on analyzing whether these changes has already 
impacts on EU natural gas market mainly in terms of actual gas flows related to EU 
diversification goals. The third part of this article is a case study on example of Slovakia, as 
                                                          
6 This paper is supported by VEGA research project No. 2/0009/12. 
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a country that was (together with Bulgaria) most affected by 2009 gas crisis and continuously 
being almost 100 % dependent on Russian gas. 
 
Natural gas market development – shale gas phenomena  
During the course of debates on shale gas importance for EU some widely believed 
misperceptions regarding current state of affairs occurred, such as U.S. is already exporting 
significant volumes of natural gas to Europe or that Europe is about to be future shale gas 
bonanza (this is coming from initial shale gas hopes which somehow stayed in minds of 
general public). 
To set the things straight, in 2013 large scale shale gas extraction is still being realized 
only in U.S. Originally started on Barnet shale Texas, now being actively developed on 
multiple shells in different states the shale gas drilling is in spite of its macro and 
microeconomic benefits still far from unanimously seen as undisputable success mainly due 
to environmental concerns and issues related to sustainability of shale gas production7. In any 
case, even if U.S. shale gas will hold to expectations predicted by EIA (2013), the exports of 
natural gas itself remain uncertain. The discussion regarding economic benefits to U.S. 
economy between options of gas exports and its domestic usage in form of cheap feedstock 
for chemical industry or alternative transportation fuels is still running. Preliminary 
permissions to export LNG are still subject to further approval process. And quite likely no 
substantial exports of U.S. LNG will be seen during next years, as U.S. politicians might as 
well decide to pursue centrist approach to energy issues. This will surely depend on ability of 
various stakeholders in promoting their interest towards policy makers (with energy 
companies willing to sell gas on more profitable European and Asian markets, and chemical 
companies and general public pushing policy makers to limit international exports in order to 
keep American natural gas prices in lower levels and so supporting industrial production and 
consequently employment). The exporting option is moreover administratively complicated 
by fact that U.S. could currently export natural gas only to countries it has signed Free Trade 
Agreement with – not the case of EU so far. Therefore, at this moment more feasible option 
for EU to get to (possible) American shale gas exports seems to be 2012 proposal by then-
Senator Lugar suggesting NATO could gain legal status of FTA for this mater.   
                                                          
7 Except for direct pollution due to fracking fluids leakage or methane migrating to water wells due to 
mismanaged casing and flow back water treatment, and undisclosed fracking chemical issues (all believed to be 
technically solvable issues), the debate triggered by paper of Howarth – Santoro - Ingraffea (2011) reporting 
extensive amount of fugitive methane emissions questioned the whole positive environmental contribution of 
shale gas replacing coal energy mix. This finding was not able to withstand the scientific scrutiny and proved to 
be flawed – the question remained widely discussed though. Breakthrough Institute (2013) on the other hand 
claims that shale gas actually has a net environmental benefit as it is replacing coal in electricity generation. 
This has already led to decline of consumption of coal in yearly magnitude of 50 million tons. Cheaper natural 
gas has also positively contributed with more than $100 billion to the economy every year since 2009. B. 
Warner (2013) however noted that this coal was not left in ground but exported to Europe where it replaces 
natural gas from energy mix which naturally negates global positive impact of shale gas. The second large shale 
gas issue continuously being discussed is the sustainability of U.S. shale gas extraction due to rapid production 
rates decline of drilled wells during first two years. That forces the growing speed of larger amount of wells 
being drilled if production growth should keep its production growth trend or at least stay at plateau. Since 
sweet production spots will be running out the overall financial sustainability of shale gas drilling is questioned. 
The answer for this is production of associated NGL which makes production of shale gas profitable even at low 
prices of natural gasa. 
aRao (2012) argues as follows on example of Marcellus Shale. Wet gas (liquids associated with natural gas) 
averages 7 gallons per mcf. That is 0,17 barrels since each barrel contains 42 US gallons. Take an oil price of 
$100/bbl. For natural gas assume $4 per mcf. The liquid component is worth 0.17x$100x0.3(discount factor 
added for conservatism) = $5.10. While associated gas is worth $4. No matter what reasonable discount you 
apply, the liquids materially add to the profitability of gas. 
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The situation regarding the shale gas drilling in EU is not very promising either. The 
general overview of situation is clearly visible from EIA (2013) updates of its first estimate 
of world shale gas resources (EIA, 2011) that downgraded the resource base by some 27 %. 
Table 1 Shale gas resources in Europe 
 
Source: EIA (2011), EIA (2013) 
 
The simple comparison shows that original assessment was overestimated and 
multiple experts have already come to conclusion that shale gas extraction will be more 
challenging and importantly, significantly more expensive in EU. The situation in individual 
countries differs as shale gas faces heavy opposition which led France and Bulgaria to put 
moratorium on development of this resource. Even countries supporting shale gas extraction 
did not record any extraordinary success due to geology factors, lack of equipment and 
complexity of landownership’s right. Initial optimism of Poland is slightly fading after 
government granted concessions for 100 wells (48 drilled so far) did not bring expected 
results and some companies (Marathon Oil, Talisman Energy, Exxon Mobil) already pulled 
out8. The new shale gas center moved to UK, where it gained support not only from D. 
Cameron but also, less expectedly, from J. Lovelock9. However results can not be expected 
very soon. As H. Rogers (2013) noted public acceptance, successful drilling test and overall 
framework for shale gas extraction is far from being at place, concluding that even in positive 
scenario plateau production is not likely to arrive before 2023-2028. The other EU countries 
currently examining the possibilities of shale gas drilling are Netherland, Romania, Latvia 
and Ukraine10.  
By adding to above mentioned difficulties the issues of social acceptance of hydraulic 
fracturing technique, inappropriate market regulation and external influences, lead times of 
successful project can be expected closer to 2020 then in near future, with Poland currently 
still seemed to be forerunner. 
                                                          
8 Reuters (2013) recently reported that Lane Energy Poland, an oil and gas exploration company controlled by 
ConocoPhillips has a very promising results from its test well drilled in Lebork. 
9 British environmentalist and author of Gaia theory. 
10 Ukraine is aiming at signing Association Agreement with the EU in November and decline on Russian offer 
to join Custom Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) which would award Ukraine with natural gas import 
prices decrease to $160/1000m3 (Hafner, 2012). Unconventional gas seemed to be a tool that could help to 
break Russian influence on Ukraine and therefore reported Russian pressure to halt Ukraine unconventional gas 
drilling, for instance by efforts to gain ownership over pipelines, is not surprising (Gonchar, 2013). 
2011 2013
France 5 040                              3 836                              
Germany 224                                 476                                 
Netherlands 476                                 728                                 
Norway 2 324                              -                                   
U.K. 560                                 728                                 
Denmark 644                                 896                                 
Sweden 1 148                              280                                 
Poland 5 236                              4 144                              
Lithuania 112                                 56                                   
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria 532                                 -                                   
Romania, Spain, Bulgaria -                                   1 540                              
Total 456 288                         355 152                         
Technically Recoverable Shale Gas Resources 
(bilion m3)Country
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Russian factor – Gazprom losing ground 
Even though shale gas development gained prime attention in recent years, as we have 
shown in first part of our article, it has not a chance to physically access the EU natural gas 
network so far and its impact on EU natural gas market is only indirect. Taking into account 
the factor of time, more interesting development for EU occurred on Russian natural gas 
market.  
 Russian federation holds 26,6 % of world gas reserves (Gonda, 2013), of which 
Gazprom owns 70 %. Gazprom as a sole operator of trunk pipeline system (Unified Gas 
Supply System) and the only exporter of Russian natural gas was many years covering the 
largest share of EU imports and was considered as a reliable gas supplier to EU countries. 
Despite EU efforts for diversification, no major changes of this state could be expected. 
Things has however started to change due to well known development on global energy 
markets – U.S. shale gas increased gas supply on American continent releasing the 
incremental LNG sources, natural gas demand in EU stumbled as a result of Great Recession, 
and oil prices reached historical records and kept at level around $100/bbl which 
consequently increased the natural gas prices in EU still linked to oil prices. Lagging reaction 
of Gazprom on this development together with natural gas crisis from 2000s was enough for 
him to weaken his position on EU natural gas market. Since the beginning of century we 
could observe Gazprom market share on third countries imports of gas to EU has fallen from 
almost 50 % (with exports of 4 540 PJ) in 2000 to some 30 % in 2011 (4 102 PJ). During this 
period the overall decline of importance was not caused by declining imports but rather by 
rising European demand for imports that Gazprom did not manage to catch. Norway for 
instance almost doubled it exports to EU throughout the observed period (1921 PJ vs. 3 715 
PJ). During last 3 years EU demand stagnated and the market share of Gazprom has looked 
stabilized. In some existing contracts Gazprom has revised its gas pricing formula such that 
Take or Pay volumes of contracted gases were lowered from 85 % to 60 % and 15 % of 
indexation is now related to gas average price on gas hubs in EU (Konoplyanik, 2012). And 
even if Gazprom did not manage to prevent from concessions and arbitrages with its 
European customers, the oil price indexation formula stayed at place.  On the other hand this 
also meant Gazprom kept loosing on his attractiveness and in 2012 his leadership on 
European market was overpassed by Norwegian gas exports for the first time (Euractiv, 
2013). 
Graph 1 The position of Russian exports to EU market 
 
Source: Authors, based on Eurostat data 
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But this is not the only challenge Gazprom suddenly needed to handle. Russian 
domestic gas prices were historically subsidized in order to stay affordable for households 
and supportive for enterprises. Also this ceased to be true in recent years. Average natural gas 
prices to Russian industry have increased consistently in recent years, from $0.4 per million 
British thermal units (MBtu) in 2000 to $2.8/MBtu in 2010. The stated aim, since 2007, has 
been to increase industrial prices to EU “netback parity”. The original deadline of 2011 was 
postponed till 2014-2015 due to rapidly increasing reference price in Europe (due to 
mentioned oil linkage of prices) (IEA, 2011). More importantly, this price increase had “side 
effects” and made Russian domestic market attractive and profitable for other Russian 
producers such as Novatek, Rosneft, Lukoil and others. These started to challenge Gazprom 
initially on Russian market (Henderson, 2013; Pirani, 2013) and now even expansion to 
international Gas market seems to be viable in near future. Such development should be 
supported by EU since these suppliers are able to operate more efficiently and so far it seems 
they could even offer prices based on European hubs and not only the oil linked model that is 
preferred by Gazprom. Moreover with Gazprom position of Russian geopolitical weapon 
shaken by Rosneft – TNK BP takeover, even Gazprom strategy towards its customers might 
needed to be more market oriented. Nevertheless, according V. Drebentsov the Russian 
government has still given Gazprom a chance to show he can defend his position and 
business model in Europe, otherwise new and very likely more effective Russian gas 
producers will gain the access to international market which was basically confirmed by D. 
Medvedev (Tibold, 2013). The „moment of truth” is expected to come in the second part of 
this decade, when new substantial LNG volumes coming on stream will bring new liquidity 
to global natural gas market.  
 
Diversification options of natural gas supply for EU 
EU gas production itself is currently mainly concentrated in two countries: UK where 
the production trend is declining and Netherland that producing on plateau level during last 
years. With natural gas being considered the fossil fuel of 21.century the rising important 
dependence of EU is inevitable and energy security questions naturally arise. Creation of 
unified gas market in EU and diversification of sources were therefore primary objectives of 
EU gas policy during last decade. Focusing on diversification from Russia, EU eventual 
options includes the Caspian region, North Africa, new sources in Levantine basin and LNG. 
Countries of Caspian region however as it seems nowadays are more likely to orient their 
export towards Asia, with Azerbaijan exports via the planned TAP pipeline being the only 
exception right now. North African diversification option includes Libya, Egypt and 
Algeria11. These countries have substantial gas reserves 8,1 Trillion cubic meters (Tcm) (BP, 
2013) and in 2011 their combined export to EU already reached 50 % of Russian. Its further 
extension is for now limited by political and violent regime changes in these countries, which 
do not create environment suitable for further growth of exports and domestically subsidized 
gas consumption even limits the export options from operating fields. Moreover, terroristic 
attack on Algerian gas facility in January 2013 might have negatively influence foreign 
investment in this sector for the future. New discoveries of natural gas fields in Levant Basin 
represents another options diversify suppliers of natural gas. Current estimations of natural 
gas reserves by EIA (2013) is 3,4 Tcm with substantial share belonging to Cyprus and Israel. 
However the political stability of region long terms suffer and currently is threatened by 
continuing civil war in close Syria and export infrastructure that needs to be put in place in 
order to export suggests this will not be a „cheap“ gas (Okumus, 2013). Even if all the issues 
will be resolved successfully, the export volumes are likely to be some 13-14 bcm/year. To 
                                                          
11 Algeria shale gas resources are even estimated to overcome those conventional. 
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Year
Country
No. 
terminals
Nominal 
capacity/bcm
No. 
terminals
Nominal 
capacity/bcm
No. 
terminals
Nominal 
capacity/bcm
Spain 6 60,1 8 71,9 9 79,8
UK 4 51,1 5 64,1 5 64,1
France 3 23,8 4 36,8 5 61
Netherlands 1 12 1 16 1 16
Italy 2 11 3 14,7 6 43,3
Belgium 1 9 1 12 1 12
Portugal 1 7,9 1 7,9 1 7,9
Greece 1 5,3 3 12,9 3 12,9
Sweden 1 0,5 3 1,3 3 1,3
Norway 1 0,2 1 0,2 1 0,2
Croatia 2 12 2 12
Estonia 2 5,5 2 5,5
Finland 1 0,1 2 2,1
Ireland 1 3 1 3
Latvia 1 5 1 5
Lithunia 1 4 1 4
Poland 1 5 1 5
Malta 1 2
Total 21 180,9 39 272,4 46 337,1
2013 2017 2022
put things into perspective EU natural gas consumption was 443 bcm and imports from third 
countries reached some 294 bcm (BP, 2013). Importance of LNG for EU was growing during 
last years due to above mentioned development. Since the turn of millennia 103 bcm of 
capacity was added which is in contrast with consumption that virtually has not changed 
(440,3 bcm in 2010 vs. 443,9 bcm in 2012), however need for 85,9 bcm of incremental 
imports due to declining endogenous production occurred during the same period which 
explains the ratio behind this. GIE data shows that LNG capacity should continue in its 
growth trend and by 2022 could be even 87 % higher (see table 2).  
According to IEA (2011) New Policy Scenario at that time EU consumption shall be 
roughly at nowadays levels and therefore LNG imports could cover as much as 100% natural 
gas net imports projected in EC (2009) reference scenario of 283 bcm in 2025. The rationality 
of such capacity building can be questioned not only with respect to threat of congestions in 
natural gas infrastructure in Western Europe under LNG glut assumption (Dieckhöner – 
Lochner – Lindenberger, 2013). Competitiveness of LNG supplies raise (at least for now) 
another questions when despite the growth of LNG terminals capacity, imports peaked in 
2010 reaching some 88 bcm and then went down when 2012 import of 61 bcm was even 
below 2009 level of 63 bcm (BP, 2013) resulting in some 40 % capacity utilization. LNG 
imports are used mainly to meet winter peak demand and remain underutilized during the rest 
of the year. Reason for this, except for contracted volumes of natural gas from pipeline 
suppliers, is pricing, when LNG coming to Europe is still in many cases priced on the oil 
indexation basis (Ratner et al.,2013)  
Table 2 LNG terminals (number & capacity) – existing, under construction and planned 
Source: Authors, based on data from www.gie.eu.com 
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Seeing these limits of EU diversification effort, the obvious conclusion is continuing 
dependence on natural gas coming from Russian Federation. Therefore we continue with 
analyzing development on natural gas market from this angle.  
 
Pipeline politics impacts on CEE countries 
According to B. Schaffer (2013) there exist 3 different types of relationships between 
importers and exporters of natural gas: mutual dependence, one of the parties is dependant on 
exported/imported natural gas, none of the countries is dependant on this relationship. It is 
clear that mutual relationship of individual EU countries towards Russia differs with respect 
to their size, natural gas consumption, sourcing diversification but also technological level 
and mutual trade with other goods. If EU could act as a single player, it could obviously 
significantly improve not only security of supplies but also its position for contracts 
negotiations. The need to do that has been seen at least since two major cut offs of Russian 
gas flows from the first decade of century, that had negatively impacted countries primarily 
located on eastern part of continent. As the EC concluded in 2010, the severity of impact 
could be much lower if any, if better mutual interconnections between EU countries exist, 
since there was abundance of natural gas supply in other parts of EU (Boersma, 2013). The 
planned deadline for finalization of unified natural gas market for 2014 is not going to be 
matched and according to 2012 EC report multiple national states still did not adopted rules 
of “Third Energy Package”. Some analysts even comments that creation of unified gas 
market can be the question of decades of institutional development before functioning 
properly (Makholm, 2012) – this means Russia can continually enjoy the state of 
asymmetrical dependence with individual EU states.  
Nevertheless, EC also noted that significant improvement had been reached already. 
For instance the ten fold increase in natural gas hub based trading and tools such as EEPR 
have already enabled the greater connectivity of intra EU gas infrastructure. According EC 
energy webpage as in September 2012 there were thirteen infrastructure projects 
(interconnectors and reverse gas flows) finished and another 18 were supposed to be finished 
by 2015. This indeed evokes greater security of supplies as most of the finished projects were 
realized in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), countries most dependant on 
single supplier from Russia. However the real contribution of these projects shall only be 
visible after creation of single gas market. This is clear from simple comparison of gas flows 
in Europe between 2010 and 2012, when only major change was that gas from Russia was 
not exported via Slovakia and Czech to Germany but flew via Nord Stream directly to 
Germany which is becoming the main European Hub12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12This may however bring positive consequence when taking into account development on German gas hubs 
(NCG and Gaspool) which may replace UK NBP position of European most liquid hub and become reference 
points for price creation in continental Europe and provide access to spot traded gas to traditional Central 
European gas transit states. 
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Graph 2 Russian gas export routes to EU countries 
 
Source: Authors, based on IEA data 
Note: For this purposes gas flowing via Ukraine and Belarus is considered to be Russian without further 
analysis, as Eurostat records only minimum Ukraine gas exports and none from Belarus during observed 
period. 
 
It is clear that presence and close future on EU natural gas market is very likely to be 
influenced by Russian pipeline politics. Russian effort do diversify its export routes that 
began in 1990s with building Yamal pipeline going through Belarus and Poland further to 
Germany with capacity 33 bcm/year and now with two lines of Nord Stream with capacity of 
55 bcm/year created a solid platform to replace gas flowing via Brotherhood pipeline through 
Ukraine. Brotherhood pipeline with original capacity of 170 bcm/year and currently capable 
to transport some 115 bcm/year is still backbone of Russian gas transit routes with total 
capacity of 256 bcm. With potential of South Stream four pipelines and possible construction 
of Nord Stream 3 and 4 adding another 118 bcm/year capacity the Ukraine route might be 
abandoned in the future (Hafner, 2012). 
As already mentioned, the finalization of Nord Stream (and related interconnectors) 
has already altered the gas patterns flows in Central Europe, when east to west transmission 
stopped being only viable option. On the other hand Nabucco project failure means that only 
the transportation risk was resolved while at the same time Russian gas lever towards EU 
Central European countries transiting gas has grown as a result of multiple Russian options of 
export routes. The planned TAP pipeline is without doubts of lesser geopolitical significance 
compared to Nabucco which was intentionally aimed to reveal the 80 – 100 % dependence of 
these countries on Russain gas (Koranyi – Brzezinski – Bryza, 2013) no matter what EU 
official statements claim. Another Russian project – South Stream – which will have similar 
impact on Southest Euope is already under construction and potential Yamal Europe pipeline 
would only strengthen the Russian leverage over individual EU transit countries and 
undermine economical feasibility of any future attempts to revive Nabuco project.  
According R. Likvern (2012) the Norway gas production has already reached its 
plateau and will start declining till 2020 so relying on incremental volumes for CEE countries 
from this source might be risky. Basically, for time being, this implies that for countries of 
CEE, LNG and North-South Natural Gas corridor despite all the risks may be the only viable 
option to increase its gas diversification in the close future.  
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Case Study: Slovakia 
Natural gas is with some 35 % most important element of Slovakian energy mix. 
Endogenous resources are negligible, with production peaked in 1958 – 1962 at levels 1,1 - 
1,3 bcm and currently reaching only around 100 Mcm/year. Country is so almost 100 % 
dependant on imports from Russia. Slovakia, thanks to its history, has extensive network of 
gas distribution network (second largest in Europe after Netherland) and 94 % of inhabitants 
has direct access to gas supply since the natural gas consumption was supported by 
subsidized prices of natural gas resulting from former ties to Russia. So far, the maximum 
consumption was reached in 2000 with 6,9 bcm (BP, 2012). During the first decade of 
millennium the consumption mowed toward 5 bcm as a result of rising prices and higher 
industrial efficiency of usage and at the end of decade was pushed upward to 6 bcm mainly 
by start up of new 440 MW CCGT power plant13.  
Energy security was for a long time outside the scope of interest within Slovakia as 
country could rely on its importance of transit state. The Brotherhood pipeline was 
transporting over 90 bcm a year that continued to Austria, Czech Republic and above. Only 
the Ukraine – Russia gas crisis from January 2009 highlighted the vulnerability of Slovakia. 
Slovak Republic was cut off from supplies for 11 days, gas supplies to manufacturing 
enterprises had to be interrupted and economical damage is estimated to 1 billion EUR 
(Duleba, 2009). This happened only few months after Slovak republic signed 20 year contract 
on natural gas supply and issued Energy Security Strategy – this basically helped Slovakian 
officials to handle the situation, and within the few days of supply interruption a back flow of 
natural gas from Czech Republic was enabled, the very same day as Ukraine and Russia 
reached agreement and original natural gas supplies were restored. 
In order to prevent future occurrence of such situation Slovakia started to pursue a 
strategy of diversification via integration into Central European gas network, upgrading the 
transmission system into bidirectional flows and natural gas storage extensions, which was 
financially supported by EEPR. Under assumption of continuity of current geopolitical 
trends, this is certainly crucial for the future of Slovakian energy security. Gazprom already 
cut the shipments transported to EU via Brotherhood pipeline from some 90 bcm to 
approximately 50 bcm after the opening of Nord Stream. 50 bcm a year is reportedly the 
volume contracted by Slovak transmission system operator – Eustream – under the ship-or-
pay clause till 2028 to move through the country further to EU (TASR, 2012). At that time 
South Stream and potentially Nord Stream 3-4 can be built which would made Brotherhood 
pipeline only one of many choices. If current political climate between Russia and Ukraine 
does not change, this will surely not be pipeline of choice. This was confirmed by Russian 
intention to build Yamal – Europe (going from Poland to Slovakia, Hungary and Austria) 
branch that could cover the grey zone of Russian gas supplies after possible exclusion of 
Ukraine as a supply route option.  
 On the other hand Slovakia has still potential to benefit from its vast gas transporting 
infrastructure even after the potential rerouting gas flows towards bypassing the Ukraine in 
the future. Even if the Open season for new interconnection between Ukraine and Slovakia 
did not prove successful, already current technical conditions enable Eustream to transport 80 
Mcm/day (28,8 bcm/year) to Ukraine that is with 50 bcm/year consumption third largest 
consumer in Europe. Nowadays Ukraine is still in dispute with Gazprom in order to negotiate 
conditions for such actions and future interest of Ukraine will definitely depend upon the its 
achievement in development of domestic sources, although Slovakia needs to keep 
                                                          
13 This power plant with operation efficiency of 59 % is likely going to be conserved after only two years of 
operation (or even the possibility of its dismantling and moving to Turkey is being discussed) due to high 
natural gas prices and strong electricity generation from RSE that are covering the most valuable peak electricity 
demand. 
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considering this option if it does not want to lose all the financial benefits resulting from gas 
transportation. 
As for non Russian diversification option of Slovakia, we already mentioned that 
Slovakia was supposed to benefit from Nabucco pipeline originally intended to be destined in 
Baumgarten gas hub in Austria, close to western border of Slovakia. This will likely not 
happen, even though the final cancelation of Nabuco (West) project is still off the table and 
this project is still on EU priority list (Reuters, 2013). LNG option for Slovakia include so 
called North-South gas corridor. This would include bidirectional connection between LNG 
terminals Adria (Croatia) Świnoujście (Poland) with aggregated capacity of 17,5 – 22,5 bcm 
integrating also Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic. The aggregated consumption of 
natural gas in these five countries in 2012 was some 44 bcm so this route would indeed have 
significant diversification potential. Looking at this option nowadays we can observe that this 
project is still quite far from being finalized. LNG terminal in Poland is projected to be 
finished in 2014 however the interconnection to Slovakia is missing, while interconnection 
between Slovakia and Hungary is being finalized, however the ADRIA LNG has currently 
only form of proposal and could be operational at best case in 2016.  
 
Recent  trends 
In 2012 5,4 bcm of natural gas flew to Slovakia and partially further to Austria from 
Czech republic. This not only highlighted the diversification options but has direct impact for 
Slovakian natural gas consumers since this natural gas, originating from German hubs, 
constituted some 2 bcm of 6 bcm of Slovakian consumption in 2012 as ICIS (2013) reported. 
Spot traded natural gas gained access to Slovakia thanks to liberalization on Slovak natural 
gas market which attracted multiple suppliers that, unlike Slovak national incumbent SPP, are 
not limited by long term gas supply contract with Gazprom and therefore can be more 
flexible towards market needs. In spite of that, prices of natural gas in Slovakia for small 
enterprises and households have shown growing trend during last years as they were 
historically capped on artificially low levels by decisions of National regulation authority, 
repeatedly accused of unclear methodology of price settings – meaning the sector of natural 
gas supply to households is long term unprofitable business. Those aspects, according to 
various commentators, were the main reasons of recent reshuffle on Slovakian natural gas 
market. In 2013 E.ON and RWE (now former 49 % shareholders of SPP) backed out from 
SPP and sell their part to local equity company – EPH, that consequently sold the trading part 
of the company struggling with changing market environment to Slovak state, leaving only 
profitable divisions of company (distribution and transportation) for itself. In autumn 2013 
this transaction was finalized despite wide disagreement of Slovak political opposition parties 
that accused ruling party of corruption and even tried to appeal prime minister. Even if not 
taking these aspects of deal into account, it is very clear that under assumption of Slovak 
government owning gas trading company and with power over regulation authority a serious 
threat of market distortion arise. This may endanger the overall potential benefits of 
Slovakian diversification effort as on regular basis some market players will decide not to 
trade on Slovakia and diversification infrastructure being built will be put only in position of 
emergency backup.  
 
Conclusion 
American shale gas development has undoubtedly become a prime driver of world 
scale changes on natural gas market especially in EU. Extension of shale gas extraction to EU 
remains questionable. However indirect impacts are already visible in form of changing 
business model of former largest EU natural gas supplier – Russia – that might need to 
consider revamping its business model of natural gas trading in near future. Competition 
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between multiple Russian natural gas exporters would surely be beneficiary for EU citizens 
as Russian importance to EU with respect to natural gas will remain and its negotiating 
position towards some EU countries will be even reinforced by its diversified transport 
routes. As for now, only LNG has the real potential to alter it. This will however materialize 
only in case the additional infrastructure is built and LNG business model together with 
world scale competition for LNG supplies create incentives for EU customers to prioritize 
this source – for now this is not the case and private investments to new gas infrastructure 
projects within EU can be expected only on limited scale when the current message conveyed 
by the European Commission says that there will be no more gas in 2050 (Badida, 2013). To 
sum it up EU with respect to natural gas can currently be seen as a passive observer not the 
driver even in its own territory. And as the example of Slovakia clearly documented, these 
changes (shale gas, EU liberalization together with extensive regulation, accompanied by 
subsidized renewable energy sources) have potential to significantly distort traditional 
organization of market with potential of negative impacts on gas consumers and threat to 
country’s energy security.  
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